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[Abstract] The report analyses the international engagement in Sudan since the Comprehen-
sive Peace Agreement (CPA) in relation to the Principles for Good International Engagement 
in Fragile States and Situations, which the OECD/DAC is currently developing. The report 
concludes that donor coordination has been quite advanced in Sudan, with a number of inno-
vative mechanisms tried out. Furthermore, there has been a concerted effort towards contrib-
uting to the building of the South Sudan state. This effort, however, has focused on building 
institutions from the top down in Juba, without a complementary emphasis on building le-
gitimacy and the relations between state apparatus and society. Moreover, strengthening the 
relationship between the Government of National Unity and the Government of South Sudan 
has been given relatively less attention. In terms of peacebuilding, there are also challenges 
for international engagement. More could have been done to contribute to a short-term peace 
dividend, and perhaps also to support the implementation of the CPA. On the basis of the 
experiences of the case of Sudan, the OECD/DAC Principles are found to be very relevant for 
guiding international engagement. 
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Executive Summary 
The OECD/DAC is developing a set of ‘Principles for Good International 
Engagement in Fragile States and Situations’. A draft version of the Princi-
ples was developed in 2005, to be piloted in a number of different countries. 
Norway assumed the responsibility of facilitating the pilot for Sudan. This 
was done through a workshop and a large number of consultations with dif-
ferent stakeholders – Sudanese as well as representatives of the international 
community engaged in Sudan. The Norwegian Institute of International Af-
fairs has been commissioned by Norad to write this report, which summa-
rizes the findings from this process. The contents of the report are solely the 
responsibility of the authors. 
For the Sudan pilot, it was decided to concentrate on the conflict between 
the North and the South and the peace process that has led to the Compre-
hensive Peace Agreement (CPA), and leave the ongoing conflicts in Darfur 
and elsewhere aside. It was further decided that the Sudan pilot would focus 
on three key elements of the Principles: Donor coordination, state-building 
and peacebuilding. 
While Sudan has counted with a strong regime for a long time, there are 
nevertheless a number of fragilities to the Sudanese state. These include the 
lack of democratic institutions; the fact that the state has not been able to 
spread development and the benefits from the oil revenue evenly throughout 
the country; that a number of insurgencies challenge the state’s monopoly on 
violence, and that the regime’s policy of arming competing militias has fur-
ther weakened this monopoly; the fact that South Sudan is building its state 
structure almost from scratch; the vulnerability of the CPA and the chal-
lenges of building the relations between the Government of National Unity 
(GoNU) and the Government of South Sudan (GoSS); and the fact that dif-
ferent Sudanese conflicts are at different stages from open war to somewhere 
along the transition to peace, yet interact and influence each other. 
With respect to donor coordination, a number of different coordination 
mechanisms have been tried out in Sudan, some of them quite far-reaching 
and innovative. These include the JAM process, the Multi-Donor Trust 
Funds, the Joint Donor Office and the Budget Sector Working Groups of the 
GoSS. This emphasis on coordination has brought benefits of reduced trans-
action costs and strengthened ownership for the recipient, and helps avoiding 
the duplication of efforts. However, there have also been costs, particularly 
in terms of a slowness of implementation. 
The international engagement with state-building has been strongest with 
respect to Southern Sudan. Here there have been concerted efforts to con-
tribute to building the administrative apparatus of the GoSS. A weakness in 
this context, however, has been the focus on building exclusively from the 
top down, with a concentration on institutions in Juba and on building ad-
ministrative capacity while less attention has been given to issues of building 
legitimacy and accountability. There has been less aid and less engagement 
for state-building with respect to the GoNU. There have also been relatively 
few international efforts at strengthening the relationship between the GoNU 
and the GoSS. While it may be difficult for the international community to 
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make a strong impact here, this lack of attention is nevertheless lamentable 
given the crucial importance of this relationship for the future of Sudan. 
With respect to peacebuilding, the international community has so far 
largely failed in the efforts to provide immediate peace dividends on the 
ground in the war-affected areas. Slow implementation is a major weakness 
in the international engagement after the CPA, and there is common agree-
ment that in similar situations in the future, there is a need for having sepa-
rate implementation mechanisms that can ensure that quick impact is also 
achieved. With regards to security issues, the UNMIS peacekeeping mission 
is an important effort of the international community. However, there are 
other crucial security concerns, related for instance to DDR and to the trans-
formation of the SPLA into a professional army, that is receiving only lim-
ited support. When it comes to implementing the many elements of the CPA, 
this is of course primarily the responsibility of the signing parties. However, 
it seems that the international community could have done more to support 
and encourage this process. The escalation of the Darfur conflict is part of 
the reason for this, as it has unavoidably served to divert the attention of the 
international community. 
In conclusion, in the case of Sudan there have been instances of tension 
between the objectives of state building and donor coordination on the one 
hand, and of acting fast in order to create rapid peace dividends on the other. 
Furthermore, in the concerted international efforts at coordination and 
alignment, there are dangers that civil society may be left out or relegated to 
having only a service-delivering role, while the importance of creating a 
strong civil society to press for good governance is overlooked. Finally, the 
particularity of post-CPA Sudan, where two governments are to function 
within one state, poses special challenges for the international community, 
which has not always managed to deal with this situation in a way that 
serves to build the relations between the GoNU and the GoSS. 
The experiences of Sudan show the relevance of the OECD/DAC Princi-
ples for good international engagement with fragile states and situations. 
Some of the successes in Sudan stem from following the recommendations 
of the Principles, while weaknesses might have been at least partly avoided 
by closer attention to all of the elements of the Principles. However, the Su-
dan case also points to possible further revisions to the Principles, such as 
the explicit acknowledgement of the fact that at times different principles 
may be in conflict and require trade-offs, and the need to also take into ac-
count the regional context. 
1. Introduction 
The OECD/DAC Principles 
OECD/DAC’s ‘Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile 
States and Situations’ (hereafter referred to as the Principles) represents an 
initiative to address the complexity and need for coordinated international 
action in situations encompassing both security, humanitarian and develop-
ment issues.1 The initiative builds upon, and aims to complement, the Paris 
Declaration on aid effectiveness endorsed in OECD in 2005. The Paris Dec-
laration emphasizes five main aspects of aid effectiveness; ownership, har-
monization, alignment, results and mutual accountability.2 Furthermore, the 
Principles are also inspired by the initiative of Good Humanitarian Donor-
ship, endorsed in Stockholm 2003. 
A draft version of the principles was presented in 2005 for the pilot proc-
ess. Feedback from the pilot process is used for revising the principles, and a 
final version is supposed to be endorsed by a high level meeting in the 
OECD/DAC in spring 2007. Nine pilot countries were selected for the pilot-
ing. Norway undertook the task of facilitating the piloting the Principles in 
Sudan.3  
The intention of the Principles is to guide international engagement in 
fragile states to maximise the positive effect of their actions, and reversely to 
hinder negative impacts. The draft principles are 
1. Take context as a starting point 
2. Do no harm 
3. Focus on state-building as the central objective 
4. Prioritise prevention 
5. Recognise the links between political, security and development ob-
jectives 
6. Promote non-discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable socie-
ties 
7. Align with local priorities in different ways in different contexts 
8. Agree on practical coordination mechanisms between international 
actors 
9. Act fast…but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance 
10. Avoid pockets of exclusion 
Principle 1 and 2 address the basic outset, where analyzing context and con-
flict sensitivity is important. Issues of state-building and peacebuilding are 
addressed in Principles 3 to 6, whereas Principles 7 to 10 address practicali-
ties such as the need for donor coordination, harmonization and rapid im-
pact. 
                                                     
1  For a presentation of the draft Principles access OCEDs website: http://www.oecd.org/ 
document/46/0,2340,en_2649_33721_35233262_1_1_1_1,00.html or the Principles di-
rectly at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/55/34700989.pdf  
2  The Paris Declaration http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/41/34428351.pdf  
3  The other pilot countries included Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea Bissau, Haiti, 
Nepal, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Yemen and Zimbabwe. 
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The concept of ‘fragile states’ is frequently used by different actors in the 
development, humanitarian and political field to describe a rather wide and 
different range of countries and situations. In the OECD/DAC Principles the 
concept is not directly defined, but referred to as ‘countries with problems of 
weak governance and conflict’. Furthermore, the Principles stress the differ-
ence between countries that are in a ‘(i) post-conflict/crisis or political transi-
tion, (ii) countries facing deteriorating governance environments, (iii) coun-
tries demonstrating gradual improvement and (iv) countries in prolonged 
crises or impasse.’ Similarly, the need to differentiate between types of con-
straints – capacity, political will and legitimacy – is emphasized.  
Thus, ‘fragile states’ is a broad definition used to describe many different 
situations and challenges. It is therefore important to analyse and tailor en-
gagement to the specific context. During the pilot process, some countries 
have reacted to the terminology, and in the revised principles OECD pro-
poses to change the title to include fragile situations as well as states (‘Prin-
ciples for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations’). 
The Pilot Process in Sudan 
The pilot process in Sudan began with a meeting convened by the Norwe-
gian embassy in Khartoum in February 2006. Representatives from the Su-
danese governments and international actors participated, both DAC mem-
bers and non-DAC members. Former minister of finance in Afghanistan, 
Ashraf Ghani was a key note speaker, and the Principles were introduced 
and discussed.  
In June a task team from NORAD and NUPI4 met with key stakeholders 
in Khartoum and Juba, to discuss more in depth the Principles, their rele-
vance in Sudan, and how to move further with the piloting process. Because 
of time constraints there was a need to limit the scope of the pilot process 
and it was decided to keep the Darfur conflict in the background, and to 
rather focus on the experiences of the international engagement in relation to 
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), signed in January 2005, which 
led to the forming of the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) and the Gov-
ernment of National Unity (GoNU). Based on the consultations  a mid-term 
report on the pilot was sent to OECD-DAC in July 2006. 
The mid-term report singled out topics for further discussions for the fi-
nal phase of the piloting. It was also recommended that the second phase 
should align with processes that already were ongoing in Sudan, in order to 
avoid duplication of efforts. A workshop in Juba was proposed arranged 
together with MoFEP’s planned workshop on their aid strategy, and a work-
shop in Khartoum was supposed to be held together with the Ministry of 
International Cooperation’s intended workshop on the Paris Declaration. For 
different reasons, it was not possible to hold either of the pilot workshops. 
Instead, in November 2006 a team of two researchers from NUPI – Axel 
Borchgrevink and Anita Haslie – travelled to Sudan to follow up the mid-
term report with meetings with relevant stakeholders in Juba and Khartoum. 
In the Terms of Reference from the MFA it was decided that the Sudan 
pilot would focus on three main issues from the Principles. The first topic 
                                                     
4  Stein Erik Horjen from Norad and Anita Haslie of NUPI. 
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was donor coordination mechanisms. In Sudan, international actors have 
made great efforts in setting up coordination mechanism, both during and 
after the peace negotiations. Secondly, the issue of international support for 
state-building was selected, as this is a key point of the Principles, and as in 
the case of Sudan the establishment of two governments in a single country 
poses particular challenges. Thirdly, it was decided to concentrate on inter-
national support to peacebuilding, with specific reference to the implementa-
tion of the CPA.  
In order to assess the relevance of the Principles to the Sudan case, a 
wide range of different types of Sudanese and international stakeholders in 
Juba and in Khartoum were interviewed for this report. These included rep-
resentatives of the national and the South Sudanese governments, of bilateral 
donors, UN organizations and the World Bank, as well as representatives of 
international and Sudanese NGOs. Further interviews were carried out with 
MFA, NORAD and NGO representatives in Norway. A complete list of 
interviews conducted can be found in the annex of this report. 
Structure of the Report 
The next chapter gives a brief outline of the Sudan context. It also discusses 
in what sense Sudan can be termed a fragile state.  
Thereafter, in Chapter 3, the main findings of the report are presented. 
This chapter is divided into three parts: The first analyses experiences with 
donor coordination; the second discusses international support to state-
building (with respect to the GoSS, the GoNU, and to the relations between 
them), while the third part looks at international engagement for peacebuild-
ing and the implementation of the CPA. 
The report ends with two brief concluding chapters. The first summarizes 
the findings from the Sudan case, while the second assesses the relevance of 
these findings for the Principles. 

2. The Sudan Context 
Sudan is Africa’s largest country, and reportedly home to more than 600 
ethnic groups. Most of the fifty years since the country’s independence have 
been marked by conflict between the regime in Khartoum and armed insur-
gencies. Conflicts have taken place in different parts of the territory, but the 
conflict between the North and the South has been the longest-running. What 
is sometimes called the second civil war5 started in 1983 and ended formally 
with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 
2005. The conflict has often been explained as a religious one, between 
Muslims in the North and Christians and others in the South, or ethnically, as 
a war between Arabs in the North and Africans in the South. While these are 
dimensions that undoubtedly form part of the conflict, one underlying divi-
sion is between center and periphery. The South has been marginalized and 
exploited by the rulers from the North since pre-colonial times, and neither 
colonialism nor independence has altered the marginal position of the South. 
Increasingly, as oil exploitation has started up in areas straddling the border 
between North and South Sudan, the conflict has also become a war over 
access to resources.  
However, it is not only the South that has been marginalized by Khar-
toum – similar conditions are found in Darfur in the West, in the East, and to 
some extent even in the North. The conflict in Darfur has escalated over the 
last years, and in spite of strong international engagement – including an 
African Union peacekeeping force – and ongoing negotiations, no immediate 
solution appears in sight. In the East, armed conflict has been halted through 
the peace agreement signed with insurgent groups in 2006. 
The CPA was signed between Government of Sudan and the Sudanese 
People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), the main insurgent group. However, 
the civil war was much more complex than simply one between two parties. 
Various offshoots and splinter groups from the Sudanese People’s Army 
(SPLA) have existed, as well as more locally based militias, and the history 
of the civil war involved shifting alliances and a considerable amount of 
South-South fighting. 
Several years of peace negotiations, under the auspices of the regional 
organization IGAD and supported by a number of African and Western 
countries, eventually led to the CPA. The agreement grants the South a sig-
nificant amount of autonomy, and allows its people to decide on secession in 
a referendum to be held after a six-year interim period. For the Interim Pe-
riod, the parties agreed to work together ‘to make unity attractive’, and 
agreements were made on arrangements for power and wealth sharing. Thus, 
the new Government of National Unity (GoNU) includes both the NCP and 
the SPLM – even if dominated by the former – while the new Government 
of Southern Sudan (GoSS) is headed by SPLM and also includes NCP. The 
agreement also granted some political representation to other political groups 
that were not direct parties to the agreement. Elections were to be held 
within three years6. Both armies were to be maintained, but redeployed ac-
                                                     
5  The first started with independence in 1956 and ended in 1972. 
6  In the Interim National Constitution this period was extended to four years. 
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cording to a set timetable. In addition, a number of Joint Integrated Units 
(JIUs) were to be established by merging troops from the two armies. All 
other armed groups were either to be dissolved or merged into one or the 
other of the armies. The key element in the wealth sharing agreements was 
that the South would get 50% of the revenue from the oil produced in the 
South. Certain key issues – such as where the border between South and 
North Sudan should go – were not decided in the CPA, but left to be agreed 
upon later. 
So far, the basic elements of the CPA have been adhered to by the two 
parties. Still, there have been a lot of delays and difficulties in the details, 
and during the interviews for this report, a number of the international repre-
sentatives, both from multilateral and bilateral agencies, questioned the 
commitment of the parties to the agreement.  
Fragilities of Sudan 
From one perspective, ‘fragile’ may seem to be a misnomer when applied to 
Sudan. The regime’s strong grip on power and centralization of control over 
wealth and resources through almost two decades is better characterized as 
robust, one might argue. And yet, the Sudanese state is fragile along a num-
ber of dimensions, and the fragility of Sudan may be said to consist precisely 
in the particular and unique combination of these dimensions into one single 
system. 
One dimension relates to the lack of democratic institutions. A relatively 
small and Khartoum-based elite has controlled the state, without achieving 
inclusiveness or representation of the whole country. While the GoSS in 
many senses represents a challenge to this state of affairs, it should be 
pointed out that neither of the governments is elected. Given this situation, it 
is not surprising that the nature of the Sudanese state has remained contested 
throughout the period of independence. The lack of inclusiveness also in-
volves the distribution of resources. The regime has not been effective in 
spreading the benefits from the oil revenue the country has received over 
recent years. The government response to the needs for services and devel-
opment in peripheral areas has not reflected the potential created by this 
income. In this sense, the regime may be said to have had the capacity but 
lacked the political will – one of the forms of fragility defined by the Princi-
ples. 
Another dimension of Sudan’s fragility relates to the state’s monopoly of 
violence. On the one hand the state’s power is contested by armed groups 
and insurgencies. On the other hand the way that the regime has been main-
taining its position is indicative of another kind of fragility. In the South and 
in Darfur – and also to some extent in the East – Khartoum has responded to 
insurgencies by arming competing groups and militias. While this has so far 
proved to be a successful strategy for remaining in power, it involves volun-
tarily giving up state monopoly of violence and foments armed conflicts. 
Both the contestation of the regime’s power and the arming of militias as a 
respond to it, indicates an underlying and fundamental fragility of the Suda-
nese state. 
Regional insecurity, and Sudan’s relationship with its neighbours, is an 
additional dimension of the fragility of Sudan. The conflict in northern 
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Uganda, for example, between the government of Uganda and the Lord’s 
Resistance Army (LRA), has contributed to prolonging the conflict in Sudan. 
While the regime in Khartoum may count on a state apparatus with con-
siderable strengths, this is not the case of the GoSS. The reach and efficiency 
of state institutions have always been very limited in Southern Sudan. Previ-
ous systems of governance have relied both on traditional authorities and 
military administration. During the war, NGOs played a decisive role in 
service delivery over large areas. In sum, there is limited experience with the 
institutions of a modern, civil state. This is now being built almost from 
scratch by the GoSS7, and means that in the South, there is fragility – in the 
sense of an absence of state structures to build on – that is more extreme than 
what is found in most other fragile states. 
Furthermore, the CPA is a vulnerable agreement, which requires consid-
erable efforts from the two parties to succeed. If insufficient attention is paid 
to building the relationship between the GoNU and the GoSS, the agreement 
may fall apart. Moreover, dissatisfaction from other groups than the NCP 
and SPLM – feeling sidelined by the CPA – may also be a threat to peace. 
And in addition, the CPA, if it is adhered to, may eventually lead to the divi-
sion of Sudan. 
Finally, the conflicts in the different parts of Sudan are at various stages – 
from open war to somewhere along the transition to peace. In a sense, this 
means that Sudan by itself could be said to evince all the four types of fragile 
situations mentioned by the Principles: Post-conflict; deteriorating govern-
ance; improving situation; and prolonged crisis. Moreover, these situations 
are interrelated, and Khartoum may for instance count on a deterioration of 
the situation in Darfur to draw international attention away from other con-
flict areas.  
Understanding the fragility of Sudan therefore involves taking into ac-
count all these different dimensions of fragility, as well as the way in which 
they are interrelated. 
                                                     
7  Officers from the Southern Coordination Council represent the former administration in 
Juba and form part of the new GoSS structure. Thus, there are both ‘new’ and ‘old’ ele-
ments in place, but GoSS as such is a new institution.  

3. International Engagement in Sudan 
Donor coordination 
Donor coordination has been singled out as one of the three areas where the 
experience of Sudan is particularly relevant for the Principles. Coordination 
is directly dealt with in Principle number eight8. However, it should be kept 
in mind that issues of coordination between international actors is closely 
linked to the question of alignment with local priorities and institutions 
(Principle seven) and to issues of coherence between different institutions 
and fields of intervention, such as development, humanitarian and security 
(Principle five). The following discussion does not try to limit itself to coor-
dination only, but draws in issues of alignment and coherence where it is 
deemed relevant. 
A number of different mechanisms for donor coordination have been 
tried out in Sudan, some of them quite innovative. In the following, key ele-
ments of these experiences are described and discussed. Thereafter, some of 
the factors that work against coordination are discussed and assessed. Fi-
nally, a set of conclusions regarding coordination in Sudan are drawn. 
The JAM process 
The Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) was a comprehensive needs assess-
ment process carried out in Sudan during 14 months in 2004-2005, at the 
request of the two parties to the Naivasha peace negotiations. While it was 
originally planned as a much shorter exercise, the fact that the last phase of 
the peace negotiations took longer time than expected meant that a broader 
process could be realized. The UN (UNDP/UNDG) and the World Bank 
jointly led the JAM, which in addition to the GoS and SPLM also counted 
with the active participation of IGAD, the IGAD Partners Forum, and, at the 
technical level, a number of other donors took part. The Core Coordinating 
Group consisted of the main stakeholders and was chaired by Norway. Sepa-
rate JAMs were conducted for the Northern States and for the South, and the 
assessments were carried out through eight different thematic ‘clusters’. 
Technical expertise from UN, the World Bank and donors was organized in 
eight corresponding teams, and matched by counterparts in the GoS and 
SPLM cluster teams. The final JAM report9 was presented in March 2005, in 
advance of the Donor Conference in Oslo in April. For the programmes un-
der the National government, the emphasis was on the need to improve gov-
ernance though a process of decentralization that could stimulate broad-
based development and lead to a more equitable distribution of wealth, with 
a particular focus on the Three Areas and other marginalized and war-
affected areas. For the South, the focus was on similar development issues, 
but starting from a much weaker institutional and socio-economic level. The 
cost of the total development plan was estimated at USD 7.9 billion, of 
which the international community was asked to fund 2,6 billion. These fig-
                                                     
8  Principle number eight: ”Agree on practical mechanisms between international actors” 
9  http://www.undg.org/content.cfm?id=1276 
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ures did not include humanitarian needs, the cost of the UN mission in Su-
dan, or costs related to debt relief/arrears clearance. 
The UN/World Bank review of Post-Conflict Needs Assessments from 
December 200610 lists a number of challenges raised by such processes, 
including: 
- achieving effective prioritization and sequencing 
- managing expectations 
- ensuring that national and international actors use the Needs As-
sessment as an instrument for coordination during the transition pe-
riod 
The Sudan JAM distributes costs per year, with an emphasis on ‘quick 
win’ interventions and capacity building the two first years, and large-scale 
infrastructural investment projects mainly in the subsequent phase. There are 
thus elements of prioritization and sequencing contemplated in the plan. 
Nevertheless, representatives of both donors and multilateral institutions 
commented that the framework was still too wide. This, it was claimed, re-
sulted for instance in the approval of the first projects prepared within the 
multi-donor trust funds, rather than those that would appear to hold the high-
est priority. This ties up funds that may delay the approval of other – and 
perhaps more urgently needed – projects.  
In terms of expectations, it is clear that the JAM process and the subse-
quent donor conference created expectations that have so far not been met in 
practice. This has led to a certain degree of disillusionment, both in the 
North and the South. Possibly a greater attention during the JAM to issues of 
prioritization and to potential limitations to speedy implementation might 
have contributed to more realistic expectations. 
The usefulness of the JAM product as an instrument for coordination in 
the subsequent period hinges on several issues.  
 
- Its limited attention to prioritization is one element that has already 
been mentioned, which weakens its potential as a basis for coordina-
tion.  
- Another element relates to the degree of ownership that the stake-
holders have to the plan. The strong engagement of GoS and the 
SPLM in the process has been singled out as the distinguishing fea-
ture of the Sudan JAM compared to other post-conflict needs as-
sessments11, and should imply a high degree of ownership. This is 
for instance reflected in the general agreement on co-financing for 
the MDTFs made during the JAM, which stipulates the general rule 
that donors pay one third of costs, and the government in Khartoum 
or in Juba shall shoulder the rest. Nevertheless, given the relatively 
insignificant amount of the JAM costs within the overall budget of 
the GoNU, the seeming dependence on donor counterpart funding 
for the implementation has led some observers to question the gov-
                                                     
10http://www.undg.org/documents/9023-
PCNA_Review_Draft_Report__In_Support_of_Peacebuilding__Strengthening_the_PCN
A_-_Working_Draft_17_November.doc 
11  UNDG/World Bank (2006): PCNA Review: Phase One. Sudan Joint Assessment Mission 
(JAM) Case Study, 10. http://www.undg.org/documents/8882-
Sudan_PCNA_Case_Study___Lessons_Learned_Annex_-_Sudan_JAM_Case_Study.doc 
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ernment’s commitment to the JAM. Overall, however, a general as-
sessment seems to be that the way in which it has brought a broad 
array of stakeholders together for agreeing on common plans, with 
the two Sudanese parties playing the central role, has been the strong 
side of the Sudanese JAM process.  
- A third element relates to mechanisms for follow-up of the JAM 
process. The MDTFs (discussed below) make up a one main element 
in this. In the continuation of the JAM cluster processes, there may 
be a difference between North and South. In the South, the Budget 
Sector Working Groups (see below also) are functioning as a form 
of continuation of the JAM cluster groups, whereas similar function-
ing groups have not been established in the North  
 
It has been pointed out that the JAM process also served as a peacebuilding 
measure. The fact that it took place over an extended period, in parallel with 
the Naivasha peace negotiations, and to some extent with the same actors, 
meant that a separate arena for discussions and contact was established, 
helping in the gradual building of confidence and trust between the parties. 
In this sense, the two processes may be said to have been mutually reinforc-
ing. 
Multi-Donor Trust Funds 
The CPA calls for the creation of two multi-donor trust funds (MDTFs), one 
for the National Government (MDTF-N) and one for the GoSS (MDFT-
SS).12 The two trust funds have separate governing structures, and specific 
objectives tied to the JAM proposals. Thus, the MDTF-N shall primarily 
focus on promoting peace, pro-poor development and improved governance 
in the Three Areas and other war-affected and marginalized areas in the 
Northern States, while the MDTF-SS shall contribute to building administra-
tive capacity, basic services, infrastructure and development throughout the 
South. In principle, all MDTF projects shall be co-funded with the GoNU or 
GoSS at a 1:2 rate, and implemented in line with the governments’ respec-
tive budgets. The World Bank was chosen as administrator of the trust funds 
by the two parties. At the Oslo Donor’s Conference in April 2005, eleven 
countries pledged USD 508 million for the MDTFs for the period 2005-
200713, an amount that was subsequently increased to USD 611,7 million 
after additional pledges from six other donors. 
The MDTFs have been widely criticized for slow progress. By October 
31st 2006, USD 14 million had been disbursed by the MDTF-N, while the 
MDTF-SS had disbursed USD 46 million14. There are different reasons be-
hind this limited progress, half-way through the MDTFs first implementation 
period. Fundamentally, World Bank requirements in terms of mechanisms 
                                                     
12 For South Sudan there has also been a Capacity Building Trust Fund, funded by six donors 
and handled by UNICEF. This has been much smaller (USD 19 million for 2004-2006), 
and its primary function appears to have been to cover running costs of the SPLM/GoSS 
administration up to January 2006 when oil revenue started coming in. This fund will not 
be discussed here. 
13  Total pledges for Sudan at the conference amounted to more than USD 4.5 billion. 
14  MDTFs Technical Secretariats, National and South: Sudan Multi-Donor Trust Funds: One 
Year On. Second report covering January to October 2006. Power Point Presentation, De-
cember 2006. 
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for financial control and accountability are cumbersome under most circum-
stances, and very difficult to fulfil in Sudan – perhaps particularly in the 
South. While these requirements are important as anti-corruption measures, 
they have, in combination with the limited institutional capacity of the 
GoSS, been the major factor behind the slow disbursement. A recent review 
of the Sudan MDTFs15 furthermore levels strong critique against the World 
Bank for not taking the necessary measures to minimize and overcome these 
problems. A number of donor and government representatives interviewed in 
Sudan also pointed to difficulties in the relationship between the World Bank 
and UN agencies as additional reasons for the delays. Incompatibilities in 
routines and requirements between the World Bank and the UN agencies 
supposed to implement MDTF programs were hard to resolve. Moreover, it 
was even alleged that rivalries between the organizations made the UN 
agencies little disposed to try to overcome these difficulties, as they had an 
institutional interest in making the Bank appear inefficient in managing the 
MDTFs. The MDTF review further criticizes the general donor community 
for not having foreseen that a World Bank-administered Trust Fund would 
require considerable time for implementation and complemented it with 
other coordinated structures for quick delivery, and for building Sudanese 
structures that would make World Bank requirements easier to comply with. 
This last point expresses a consensus that over time has taken hold among all 
stakeholders. In the current Darfur JAM, this lesson has been integrated, and 
two separate mechanisms – for short-term and longer-term impacts, respec-
tively – are being discussed.  
The slow progress of the MDTFs is regrettable for several reasons. It im-
plies limited advance in key recovery, development and state building areas. 
It has also led to strong disillusionment and loss of faith in the international 
community, both within government structures at the national level and in 
the South, as well as in the broader public opinion. Similarly, as a clear 
peace dividend is not readily apparent, it may also serve to undermine faith 
in the CPA. And finally, it allows the GoNU and the GoSS to lay the blame 
for all delays on the part of the donors, thereby diverting attention from the 
need to address their own weaknesses and inefficiencies. 
International NGOs working in Southern Sudan express disappointment 
over the fact that the increases in aid to South Sudan after the CPA have 
been channelled through joint funding mechanisms such as the MDTF – SS 
or have been for the GoSS. International and Sudanese NGOs have therefore 
not experienced increased funding levels, in spite of the important role they 
have had in service delivery in South Sudan. Furthermore, there are wide-
spread concerns that the strict requirements of the trust funds will make it 
impossible for the relatively new and weak South Sudanese NGOs to access 
funds or be operators of programs supported by the MDTF-SS. This funding 
mechanism may therefore not be appropriate for the objective of strengthen-
ing civil society in a situation where this is weak or emergent.On the positive 
side, though, the MDTFs may in the long run contribute positively to state 
building process at national and GoSS levels, both through the way support 
                                                     
15  Scanteam: Review Post-Crisis Multi-Donor Trust Funds: Annex F: Sudan Multi-donor 
Trust Funds. Oslo, November 2006. 
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is linked to government plans and budgets, and for the attention to the con-
struction of accountable financial mechanisms that the funds require.  
Joint Donor Office 
The Joint Donor Office was established in Juba in May 2006 by Denmark, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and UK, as a mechanism to coordinate 
and pool development assistance from these five countries to Southern Su-
dan. Canada may join the group in the near future. The joint funds have so 
far all been channelled through the MDTF-SS.16 The intentions behind the 
office include creating a single policy framework for the GoSS to relate to, 
unify aid administration systems, and share the benefits of having a multi-
donor cross-disciplinary team. It has also been the objective to attract further 
donors to the group, and to catalyse broader harmonisation by relating to the 
wider donor community and by being an actor that can go in and fill gaps 
where other donors are not contributing. And by speaking on behalf of a 
number of important donors, the ambition is to be a key policy dialogue 
partner for the GoSS. 
The model is innovative and is said to be the first of its kind in the world. 
It implies a number of challenges, to which ways of responding will have to 
be worked out in the practical operation of the office. One relates to the 
merging of the different development policies of five (or even more) differ-
ent donors. Even though the members are generally likeminded, and overall 
agree on development needs for South Sudan, there are still important differ-
ences that need to be dealt with. One fundamental division is for instance 
over security-related issues, where the donors have differing views on what 
can be addressed under the development cooperation umbrella.  
Another important challenge stems from the fact that the role of the office 
is restricted to development cooperation. Three of the countries have addi-
tional representatives in Juba to deal with the political aspects of the rela-
tions with Sudan and GoSS. This division between politics and aid basically 
derives from the difficulty of merging the five countries’ political relation-
ships with Sudan. But clearly aid to Sudan cannot avoid politics, and the 
separation creates practical problems. 
The fact that all aid is channelled through the MDTF-SS gives the Joint 
Donor Office a key role on the Oversight Committee of the trust fund. But 
having no funds outside this fund may mean that the office has little leverage 
to ensure it becomes an important dialogue partner and player outside the 
MDTF-SS, and little opportunity for being the flexible donor that can fill the 
gaps left by others. It is currently being discussed whether in the future, the 
office should also channel other funds, thereby having a freer role in this 
respect. It remains to be seen, however, whether the office responding to five 
different capitals will be able to become a flexible donor with the ability to 
react fast when needs arise. 
Barely six months in operation it is only to be expected that the Joint Do-
nor Office still needs to work on refining modalities and structures. There 
                                                     
16  Some funding from some of the donors go outside of the Joint Donor Office. This relates 
to bilateral programmes that were ongoing before the establishment of the Office. The in-
tention is that most of these bilateral programs are to be phased out. 
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seems to be a lot of will among member countries and staff to make the in-
novative experiment successful. 
Budget Sector Working Groups, Aid Strategy and Donor Mapping 
The Budget Sector Working Groups have been established by the GoSS in 
order to fill a number of functions. On the one hand, they are an important 
mechanism for developing the overall plans and budgets for Southern Sudan. 
On the other hand, they are also explicitly designed by GoSS as an instru-
ment for donor alignment and coordination. Ten groups have been created, 
each including the relevant ministries and other government spending agen-
cies, as well as the donors active in the sector.  
In the GoSS budget process for the year 2007, these groups were 
launched. Over an intensive six-week period, they were used to work out the 
priorities of the different sectors. Donor and government representatives in 
Southern Sudan interviewed about the experience all agreed on the useful-
ness of the model. However, it was pointed out by some that not all groups 
had been equally successful in this first trial run. Difficulties related to lack 
of capacity and in some instances reluctance to use this forum by the GoSS 
ministries and agencies, as well as to a lack of continuous participation by 
donors, especially those without representation in Juba.  
The Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning of the GoSS has also re-
cently presented an aid strategy, with the objective ‘to co-ordinate develop-
ment aid to Southern Sudan within a Government-led framework, so that it is 
used effectively and aligned with the priorities of Southern Sudan’17. In this 
strategy the Budget Sector Working Groups are singled out as the key 
mechanism to ensure coordination and alignment. All donor partners are 
requested to participate in the groups pertaining to their sectors, and these 
groups are also supposed to be the first and necessary instance to approve on 
all aid projects and programmes, whether they are implemented with gov-
ernment institutions or through NGOs or UN agencies.  
The new aid strategy indicates high ambitions by the GoSS in terms of 
taking a leading role to ensure that aid is closely coordinated and aligned 
with government priorities. So far, however, the GoSS is still developing its 
administrative apparatus, and the joint donor response to the aid strategy 
questions whether the government and the Budget Sector Working Groups 
will have the capacity to realize these ambitions. A first step has been the 
donor mapping carried out in connection with the budget process.18 It cov-
ered more than 100 projects funded by 21 donors, and totalling more than 
USD one billion. According to this survey, only six per cent of the projects 
had been approved by the Inter-ministerial Appraisal Committee formally 
responsible for approving all aid. As the donor mapping was based on re-
porting by donors through the Budget Sector Working Groups, and not all 
donors were able to take part in the groups, there may be additional projects 
that were not captured in thus survey. Thus, as of now, the GoSS is a long 
way from having the key coordinating position that the aid strategy envi-
                                                     
17  Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning: GoSS Aid Strategy 2006-2011, November 
2006, p 1. 
18  Mabior, Moses: ‘Donor mapping’ Powerpoint presentation, GoSS Aid Strategy Work-
shop, Juba, November 8 2006. 
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sions, but the donor mapping, even if incomplete, marks an important start 
for assuming such a role. 
Also in the North, the GoNU has attempted a similar mapping of donor 
activities. However, lacking the institutional equivalent of budget sector 
working groups, the exercise has been dependent on individual reporting by 
the donors to the Ministry of International Cooperation. According to the 
Ministry, this reporting has been highly deficient, resulting in the GoNU 
having only an incomplete picture of aid activities, with consequent difficul-
ties for the government’s planning and coordination of development activi-
ties.19 
Obstacles to coordination and coherence 
It is possible to point to a number of factors that work against coordination 
and coherence. Some of these are assessed in the following.  
The fact that different countries have different policies and requirements 
for their development assistance limits what kind of coordination is possible. 
For instance, there are some donors that follow a principle of balanced aid to 
the GoNU and the GoSS, while a key donor such as the US with few excep-
tions gives all its development aid to the South. This means not only that the 
US has a minimal role with respect to working with the GoNU, but also that 
supporting the GoSS in building its relationship with the national govern-
ment largely remains outside the area of US engagement. However, this does 
not necessarily lead to problems. For instance in the oil and gas sector, 
where the US only supports strengthening of the GoSS technical and admin-
istrative capacity, while Norway is also engaged in strengthening the mecha-
nisms for coordination between the national level and the GoSS, all inter-
viewed agreed that these efforts were mutually supportive rather than com-
peting or conflicting. 
Security related issues, such as army reform and DDR, are politically dif-
ficult to work with for many donors and according to the UN Deputy Resi-
dent and Humanitarian Coordinator in Juba, no international body is assum-
ing the overall responsibility for DDR. In the South, the US State Depart-
ment is alone in supporting the SPLA transformation into a regular army. 
This does of course mean that there will be minimal duplication of efforts, 
but this is still problematic because of the limited international engagement 
in a key task. 
Furthermore, the US does not channel funds through the MDTF-SS, 
mainly for legal reasons. Some representatives of other donors therefore 
perceived the US engagement as uncoordinated with other activities. How-
ever, through the active participation in the JAM process and the current 
close working relationship with the GoSS, US assistance relates and re-
sponds to what other donors are doing in a number of ways. Again, it can be 
argued that the US engagement should perhaps therefore be seen as com-
plementary to other efforts. The fact that the USAID is now being perma-
nently represented in Juba should serve to strengthen this effect. 
Where an agency has its representation impinges on coordination and 
alignment in different ways. On the one hand, issues appear differently de-
pending on whether they are seen from Khartoum or Juba (or Nairobi). 
                                                     
19  Interview Undersecretary Elfatih Sidiq, Ministry of International Cooperation, 29.11.06. 
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Among the Juba-based agencies there was for instance a very clear focus on 
building the Southern Sudan state, with much less attention given to building 
the overarching relationship with the national government. In Khartoum 
there was in principle a greater focus on this, but in practice Darfur concerns 
tended to draw attention away and override the issue here as well. As a num-
ber of the Juba-based agencies (both multilateral and bilateral) reported di-
rectly to Headquarters or their capital, rather than to the representation in 
Khartoum, this difference in focus may have been strengthened. Thus coher-
ence between activities in the North and South may be weakened, as well as 
attention to the central CPA aim of making unity workable and attractive.  
On the other hand, localization affects the possibility of taking part in on-
going policy and coordination processes. Continuous participation in the 
Budget Sector Working Groups was for instance difficult for those agencies 
with no permanent Juba representation, and the same goes for attending do-
nor contact meetings organized by the UNDP or other types of formal or 
informal discussions between donors and with GoSS institutions.  
Institutional divisions and differences in perspectives between those 
working with development aid, those engaged in humanitarian efforts and 
those focusing on security issues also imply a challenge to overcome in or-
der to achieve coherence and coordination of international engagement. This 
challenge relates to Principle number five on recognising the links between 
political, security and development objectives. While efforts have been made 
to address this issue in the case of Sudan, for instance in the creation of inte-
grated UN missions, there was still a noticeable feeling of being overrun by 
a huge military UNMIS operation among the ‘civilian’ UN agencies. Ex-
plicit division of labour between developmental and more ‘political’ arms 
are also found among other international actors, such as between USAID and 
State Department, or between the political and development sections of the 
EC. Such organization runs the risk that decisions within these two spheres 
are insufficiently coordinated and taken according to different logics. The 
UK, in contrast, has organized its Sudan work contrary to normal proceed-
ings, with a joint FCO-DFID structure in London coordinating the engage-
ment.  
The complexities of Sudan further add to the challenges for the interna-
tional community to present a coherent and coordinated engagement. In par-
ticular, the Darfur conflict has demanded responses from international actors 
that at times have drawn attention away from the CPA process, or even con-
flicted with objective of supporting that process. 
Finally, it should be pointed out that the Governments, both the National 
and the Southern government, do not necessarily appear as unitary and well-
coordinated actors in all contexts either. With respect to the GoNU, there is 
for instance uncertainty among many donors about the division of responsi-
bilities between the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of International 
Cooperation, and consequently about how to relate to these structures. Simi-
larly, with respect to GoSS, donors report different attitudes among the min-
istries with respect to close coordination. While the Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Planning of the GoSS had a clear stake in a central planning proc-
ess (controlled by the Ministry itself), some of the larger implementing min-
istries appeared to be more interested in less bureaucratic and time-
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consuming relations with individual donors. The fact that SPLM is repre-
sented in GoNU and the NCP in GoSS does not reduce this problem, and 
indeed the complex relationship between GoNU and GoSS may stand as the 
overarching example of the fact that in Sudan, the government is far from 
being unitary in all respects. This, of course, makes alignment and coordina-
tion a complex affair. 
Conclusions 
The international engagement with Sudan in support of the CPA has been 
characterized by a strong concern for achieving coordination and harmoniza-
tion. A high awareness of the need for this has been encountered among all 
stakeholders interviewed for this report, and in general their assessment is 
that a relatively high degree of coordination has been achieved. A number of 
different mechanisms have been tried out, some of them quite innovative. 
Broadly, one may say that coordination and alignment are supposed to 
serve three main purposes:  
 
- Reduce transaction costs for the recipient by having fewer donors 
and different requirements to relate to 
- Avoid duplication of efforts and conflicting interventions 
- Strengthen local ownership and priority setting 
 
In Sudan, one has achieved positive results in all of these areas. Joint fund-
ing mechanisms – such as MDTFs – and donor cooperation – such as 
through the Joint Donor Office – have de facto meant fewer different in-
stances and conditions for the Sudanese authorities to relate to. The broad 
international engagement in the JAM process and, for the South, the Budget 
Sector Working Groups, has ensured adherence to a common framework for 
interventions. And the international engagement has been successful in 
aligning with national plans and priorities. Even under difficult conditions – 
an emergent and consequently weak state in the South, and a national gov-
ernment whose real commitment to the CPA has been questioned by many – 
not many donors have been criticized for attempting to impose their own 
agendas (even if donors were criticized freely on many other counts). In 
sum, then, the Sudan case must be considered relatively advanced in terms 
of achieving donor coordination. 
However, as described above, a major negative effect of the strong em-
phasis on coordination has been the slowness of implementation, with con-
sequent costs in terms of disillusionment and loss of faith in the international 
community and perhaps also in the CPA process itself. A widely shared per-
ception is thus that a mistake was made in entrusting a single funding 
mechanism – the MDTFs – with all objectives, both short-term and long-
term. Consequently, in Darfur, one is now planning for two different mecha-
nisms. Possibly, however, the lesson to be drawn might be even more radi-
cal: That the important thing about coordination relates to the need for bring-
ing all actors together for a common overall planning process, whereas im-
plementation could actually benefit from not only having two, but a multi-
tude of mechanisms that could complement each other. 
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State-building  
The third Principle refers to the need to ’Focus on state-building as the cen-
tral objective’. The Principles emphasise international engagement in two 
central areas with regards to state-building:  
1) legitimacy and accountability of states 
2) capability of states  
The first area, concerning the legitimacy of the state, refers to issues such 
as democratic governance, human rights and peacebuilding. The second area 
addresses the capability of states to fulfil core functions and to act upon pov-
erty reduction. This includes functions such as security and justice, service 
delivery, mobilization of revenues, facilitating economic development and 
employment generation. 
Within the two areas state-building processes include both the building of 
the state institutions themselves, as well as building the relationship between 
state and society. Furthermore, the Principles also emphasize that civil soci-
ety plays an important role in relation to building both the legitimacy and the 
capability of states. 
In this section we will look at state-building and international engage-
ment in Sudan with regards to three levels; the Government of South Sudan 
(GoSS), the Government of National Unity (GoNU) and the relationship 
between these. 
Government of South Sudan (GoSS) 
In South Sudan, existing government structures were very weak or non-
existing when the peace agreement was signed. The Southern Coordination 
Council was the Khartoum government institution in Juba, but in practice its 
authority did not extend to much of the territory. While the civil servants of 
the Southern Coordination Council have been kept on by the GoSS, the 
structure is basically being replaced by new institutions. Throughout 
SPLM/A-controlled areas during the war, weak civil administration struc-
tures coexisted with military authority structures and traditional forms of 
authority. Thus, post-conflict South Sudan is not only in a state of recon-
struction, but even more so in a state of construction, where the state is being 
built almost from scratch. Another important post-conflict challenge in 
South Sudan is the SPLM/A’s transition from military to a civil movement 
and government. 
GoSS’s income is based on the sharing of oil revenues as agreed upon in 
the CPA. Oil revenues from oil produced in Southern Sudan is split 50-50 
between the GoNU and GOSS after the withdrawal of 2 per cent to the oil 
producing state. Compared to many other post-conflict situations, GoSS is 
considerably better off in terms of income. On the other hand, GoSS is very 
dependent on one income source, as oil revenues constitute 95 per cent of 
the income. However, according to most international actors, challenges are 
huge in terms of institutional capability.  In the USAID Sudan strategy 
statement (December 2005), the weak institutional capability of the GoSS is 
singled out as one of five key threats to the implementation of the CPA. 
State-building is thereby also linked to peacebuilding, a topic we will discuss 
later in the report. 
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International engagement in South Sudan state-building focuses on ca-
pacity building within the GoSS where training and capacity building pro-
jects have been funded. There is a specific focus on financial management 
capacity, and both the World Bank and the USAID are funding consultants 
from Bearing Point and KPMG that work with the Ministry of Finance and 
Economic Planning (MoFEP). As the literature on technical assistance 
shows, transfer of knowledge is difficult to achieve, especially where recipi-
ent institutional structures are weak.  Expectations of immediate capacity 
building impact ought therefore to be modest. But at least this form of en-
gagement contributes to the GoSS’s ability to disburse funds. Limited capac-
ity to implement disbursements was one of the problems in 2005, and resolv-
ing this is a prerequisite for a state’s capacity to deliver services.  
Anticorruption is a major theme in strengthening institutional capacity, 
and an anticorruption commission has recently been formed by GoSS in 
accordance with CPA. Two of the state secretaries in the MoFEP have re-
cently been dismissed because of accusations of mismanagement, and their 
cases are due to be investigated by the commission. Awareness of the poten-
tial for corruption is high among the donors working in South Sudan, and 
this is for example reflected in the procedures of the MDTF. These proce-
dures are meant to contribute to the creation of transparent and accountable 
governance systems. Thus there is a state-building aim in the way the 
MDTFs are set up and operate. 
According to one participant in the Oversight Committee of the MDTF, 
the relationship between MoFEP and the different relevant ministries is still 
a challenge. The line ministries are invited at a very late stage of the plan-
ning and budgeting processes, and they may not always be well informed 
about the process. To the extent that this is the case, constructive interna-
tional engagement for institutional strengthening becomes more compli-
cated. 
The Budget Sector Working Groups also entail a state-building objective, 
and many donors participated in this exercise and are eager to continue this 
work. Although the exercise was considered to be fruitful and necessary, 
several participants expressed the need for additional technical assistance to 
the different ministries in the budget process. Another challenge in the 
budget process relates to relationship between GoSS level and authorities at 
the level of the States. States level authorities are not part of the BSWG 
process, thus they are not present when budget priorities at the government 
level are agreed upon and they do not interact with donors to the same ex-
tent. UNDP is engaged in work on the level of States and local authorities, 
but apart from this, it seemed that donors generally give little attention to the 
States and their relationship to the GoSS. The task of building state struc-
tures below the States – i.e. at County level – was largely neglected by the 
international community, as far as we could ascertain. 
USAID has chosen, as part of their Fragile States strategy, to work with a 
limited set of government institutions, and concentrate their engagement 
with only few ministries. In South Sudan, they focus particularly on infra-
structure, working with the Ministry of Housing, Land and Public Utilities 
and Ministry of Transport and Roads, and they support technical assistance 
to different ministries through Bearing Point. 
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One obstacle to State-building may be caused unintentionally by the 
presence of international organisations. Salaries are higher in international 
organisation, and the most qualified staff might be drawn to positions in 
international organisation instead of contributing to strengthening national or 
local institutions, which in turn means that government bodies may not get 
the most qualified staff. This is a challenge which international actors in 
Sudan could pay more attention to.  
The transformation of SPLA from a guerrilla force to a professional army 
is one of the major challenges in South Sudan. The US is one of the few 
donors involved in supporting this process. They work through the private 
company Dynacorp. Some donors expressed that SPLA was not participating 
and seemed disinterested in contributing to the work in the Budget Sector 
Working Group on security. The result of this lack of participation was that 
the BSWG on security did not function according to the intentions. Further-
more, the independent commissions belonging to this Working Groups - 
such as the De-mining and the Disarmament Commissions - didn’t have a 
strong role in the process either. It was also reported that MoFEP has little 
leverage in relation to the army (in contrast to MoFEP’s relations with the 
other ministries). Thus, there seems to be a lack of communication and 
openness between the different actors in the security sector, and the civil 
political institutions appear to have limited influence over decisions in the 
army. The army received 40 per cent of the 2006 budget20, yet there is little 
knowledge outside the SPLA as to how these funds are employed.  
One of the challenges with regard to state-building relates to the relation-
ship between authorities and civil society. There seems to be disagreement 
within SPLM over the extent to which an autonomous civil society should be 
promoted. The aid strategy of the GoSS does not recognize the role of civil 
society as important actors in the development of a pluralistic and democ-
ratic society; the strategy rather signals a wish to control civil society activi-
ties. NGOs played an important role as service deliverers in South Sudan 
during the last decades, and this is not recognised in the Aid strategy either. 
This, of course, makes international engagement for strengthening Sudanese 
civil society more complicated. 
In terms of international engagement in South Sudan for state-building, it 
seems that most actors focus on building the GoSS institutions and capacity. 
This is a focus on building the state from above, from the centre, while proc-
esses of building democratic relationships between state and society have 
been pushed more to the background. With reference to the OECD principle 
on state building, one may state that focus has been more on building the 
capability of the GoSS and less on building its legitimacy. 
Government of National Unity (GoNU) 
The forming of the Government of National Unity (GoNU) was agreed in 
the CPA, and both parties to the agreement, NCP and SPLM, are represented 
in GoNU. The GoNU is dominated by the former regime, the NCP. Gov-
ernment institutions are stronger and have more capacity in Khartoum than 
what is the case in Juba. Financially, the GoNU is also strong, in part be-
cause of oil revenues. International investments strengthen the economy, 
                                                     
20  CPA Monitor, November 2006. UNMIS p.23 
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predominantly from Asian companies from China, Malaysia and India, as 
well as financial loans from Arab countries. In this situation, traditional 
western donors have little leverage, as development aid represents only a 
small share of the government’s income.  
Over the last couple of years, international actors’ engagement with 
GoNU representative has  increasingly focused on the conflict in Darfur. 
This conflict has escalated since the signing of the CPA, and is given high 
priority by many international actors. Thus, because of the Darfur conflict, 
the attention of the international community in Khartoum has been diverted 
from the efforts to support the implementation of the CPA.   
There is a challenge for the GoNU to become a truly national government 
and to overcome the gap between centre and peripheries in Sudan. One di-
mension of this challenge is reflected in the weak position of SPLM in the 
GoNU. It seems that in practice, the NCP is taking most decisions, and that 
SPLM representatives are sidelined on important issues. One diplomat had 
the opinion that it is difficult for SPLM to criticize the NCP because they are 
dependent upon them. For example, the SPLM are afraid that if NCP should 
lose the elections in the North to another northern party, there is a chance 
that this new party would  not feel committed to the CPA. Not many donors 
are engaged in support to strengthen the role of the SPLM representatives in 
the GoNU, and there is also a widespread perception that the SPLM leader-
ship are not prioritising it.  
Another challenge for GoNU, related to the issue of becoming a more in-
clusive government, is poverty reduction and the distribution of wealth and 
resources. Support to war affected regions and communities is the purpose of 
the MDTF-National, and this was also the focus of the JAM in the North. A 
widely shared perception was that the GoNU’s policies did not reflect the 
agreed outcome of the JAM process. Although many agreed that ownership 
to the JAM was strong during the process and when it was presented by the 
Joint National Transition Team in Oslo, a common impression now was that 
this has changed. A large share of the national (GoNU) budget is spent on 
the military, and much less on development and reconstruction. This is 
hardly consistent with a focus on investing in peacebuilding. 
The MDTF-N shall support war affected areas, with a particular focus on 
the three disputed areas. Some international representatives were of the opin-
ion that due to the lack of prioritization in the JAM process – as explained 
above – the MDTF-N has not worked as a strategic tool, but instead spread 
its attention more randomly, on a  ‘first come, first serve’ basis.   
Some donors reported that one of the problems of cooperating with 
GoNU is that it is fragmented in its relationships to donors. There is the min-
istry of Finance, Ministry of International Cooperation, Ministry of Humani-
tarian Affairs and also the Humanitarian Affairs Committee (HAC) that are 
all involved in international cooperation and development assistance in one 
way or another. 
According to some civil society representatives, not much has changed in 
terms of governance with the signing of the CPA. For example, civil society 
is still left out and trade unions are still infiltrated by government. A new act 
has been approved by parliament, which is restraining NGO activity. This 
Humanitarian and Voluntary Work Act (GoNU) has therefore now been 
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taken to constitutional court by some Sudanese NGOs, who claim that the 
Act is unconstitutional. Furthermore, Sudanese and international NGOs re-
ported that they were regularly harassed by Sudanese authorities , partly 
through bureaucratic impediments. 
International engagement may likewise be contributing to the marginali-
sation of civil society. For instance, civil society is not included in MDTFs, 
only few NGOs have observational status in the meetings. In forums such as 
AEC that evaluate and monitor the implementation of the CPA, civil society 
is not included. 
In sum, with the GoNU counting on a strong administrative and security 
apparatus, the state-building challenges are very different from in the South. 
Furthermore, the limited importance of aid gives the international commu-
nity less leverage at the national level. This is compounded by the fact that 
important donors – such as the World Bank and USAID – do not have de-
velopment aid programs with the national government. International en-
gagement for state building can therefore not be characterized as strong at 
this level. The attention is on improving service delivery to marginalized and 
war-affected areas, but slow progress with the MDTF-N means that ad-
vances have been limited. 
The Relationship between GoNU and GoSS  
One important challenge for state-building is strengthening the relationship 
between GoNU and GoSS. This is relevant regardless of whether South Su-
dan will vote for independence after the interim period or not. There will in 
any case be a need for good relations between the entities. In terms of state-
building this is important because of their interdependence with regard to 
management of resources, as well as the need for political cooperation and 
decision making.  
Generally we got the impression that neither the NCP nor the SPLM are 
making strong efforts in order to extend and deepen political and institu-
tional relations between the two governments. Similarly, there appears to be 
limited engagement for supporting this objective among the majority of do-
nors. While a number of donors are involved in supporting the building of 
GoSS institutions, few appear to show a concern for the linkages between 
these institutions and their national level counterparts.  
One illustrating example of the importance of strengthening the relation-
ship between GoNU and GoSS concerns the cooperation in the oil sector. 
The Norwegian government provides technical assistance and capacity 
building for the oil sector in Sudan. One lesson so far is that working with 
both GoSS and GoNU is important A positive consequence of the process so 
far is that GoSS and GONU acknowledge that since the oil resources are 
shared, they have mutual interests in cooperation and capacity building in 
the sector.  
Cooperation between GONU and GoSS in the oil sector is vital, partly 
because many oil fields are situated in the South, whereas the pipeline runs 
through the northern part of Sudan up to Port Sudan and the Red Sea for 
export. There have been disputes between the parties about the National 
Petroleum Commission (NPC). The commission was formally established on 
30 October 2005 by presidential decree, but has not been functioning. Re-
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cently, however, there has been some movement in the process, and it was 
agreed that the commission shall be an independent technical secretariat (not 
integrated into the Ministry of Energy and Mining, GoNU). Earlier this year 
it was also agreed to establish Joint Monitoring Teams to verify actual oil 
production in the oil fields. 
Other central programs that cut across the north-south boundary are: the 
national census, a national currency, and transport issues. International do-
nors are engaged in all of these issues. Both MDTFs have for instance ap-
proved funding for a national census.  
There is a tension between separation and unity in the state-building 
processes of Sudan. This tension is evident in the CPA itself, manifest in the 
concept of two governments within a single country. This implies a delicate 
balance between the objectives of a meaningful autonomy in the South and 
the maintaining of unity within the larger Sudan. Donors should be careful 
that their policies do not contribute to upset this fragile balance. As there is a 
need for better coordination between the two governmental bodies in order 
to build a national state, donors should therefore follow a national strategy to 
their work in Sudan. In practice, it may appear as if many donors employ a 
two-state strategy, thereby contributing to favour separation above unity.  
Thereby they are refraining from following the spirit of the CPA, which 
states that this decision should be left to the people in South Sudan to decide. 
Conclusions 
International engagement in Sudan has put state-building in South Sudan 
high on the agenda, with a focus on building the institutional capacity of the 
GoSS. This is an important task. Yet, as the Principles point out, state-
building should also address the relationship between state and society. In 
this sense, the international engagement has not been very strong. In South 
Sudan, the donors have focused on building the state from the top, with lim-
ited attention to local government institutions. The need for building a strong 
and autonomous civil society has likewise been given a lower priority.  
With respect to the GoNU, donors’ influence is weaker, and the interna-
tional community has been less involved in state-building. The international 
state-building engagement with the national government that has been, has 
focused on the periphery and the marginalised areas. 
While the building of the relationship between the GoSS and the GoNU 
is vital and given a high priority within the CPA, it appears that this has not 
been high on the agenda for most donors. 
In sum, one may say that international engagement in Sudan emphasizes 
issues such as institution building, capacity building, and a focus on building 
the central governments. However, facilitating the relationship between state 
and society, thereby contributing to legitimacy and accountability, seems to 
be a more neglected area. 
Peacebuilding  
The signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement has brought about 
changes to many war affected areas in South Sudan, but still there are many 
challenges with regards to the implementation of the agreement. In addition, 
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the conflict in Darfur has escalated since the signing of the CPA, and throws 
long dark shadows over the North – South peacebuilding process. One con-
sequence of the Darfur conflict is that Sudan as a country is still at war, an-
other is related to international engagement with regards to the CPA. Donor 
attention shifted quickly to Darfur as conflict intensified in that region, and 
part of the funds pledged at the Oslo Donor Conference was transferred to 
humanitarian efforts in Darfur.21 According to some observers, international 
political attention also shifted away from the CPA. 
International engagement in this very complex situation is far from easy 
and straightforward. At the same time it must be recognized that it is limited 
what international engagement can achieve on its own. It is first and fore-
most the parties to the agreement and the people of Sudan that have the re-
sponsibility and must play the main role in the implementation of the CPA. 
Many have commented on a perceived lack of commitment to the imple-
mentation of CPA. Some blamed the parties to the agreement, and others 
pointed at the donors.  
Peace Dividend 
After two decades of war, a rapid impact of the peace was highly needed in 
the affected areas. The proliferation of arms is high, as are the levels of pov-
erty and mistrust between peoples. In other words, the situation is very frag-
ile, and a need for a so called ‘peace dividend’ is high.22  
However, international engagement has not managed to help deliver an 
early peace dividend on the ground in Sudan. There have not been signifi-
cant improvements in sectors such as education, health, and infrastructure. 
There are different reasons for this, related both to a limited capacity on the 
Sudanese side, as well to slowness in the international community’s ability 
to deliver. One of the reasons for this is linked to the administrative set-up of 
the MDTF. 
According to one practitioner, a problem that has affected Sudan is that 
international actors of development assistance are often unable to respond 
rapidly even when successful impact depend quick implementation. Bureau-
cratic decision-making routines and funds being tied up are two common 
reasons for this. One suggestion to overcome this problem is that donors 
could pool support in a ‘quick-response fund’.  
An unintended consequence of international engagement in Sudan is that 
international presence has pressed prices high. Accommodation and trans-
port are now very expensive in Juba, and this may potentially create tension. 
It doesn’t seem as if international actors have any solution to this, or that 
there exists any common effort into solving this.  
Security 
The CPA provides for three security forces in Sudan: The Sudan Armed 
Forces (SAF) which is the Khartoum government army, The Sudan People’s 
                                                     
21  According to a representative from the Ministry of Finance in Khartoum, 75% of the 
funds pledged in the Oslo conference went to humanitarian activities. Thus, a smaller 
share was allocated to development and reconstruction under the CPA and JAM frame-
work. 
22  The need for acting fast is discussed in Principle number nine, and can therefore be re-
lated to the delivering of a peace dividend. 
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Liberation Army (SPLA) and The Joint Integrated Units (JIUs). The JIUs are 
to be formed from SAF and SPLA forces during the interim period. Other 
Armed Groups should, according to the CPA, join either SAF or SPLA. The 
CPA also provides for redeployment of troops, with a gradual withdrawal of 
SPLA forces to the South and of SAF to the North. 
In practice, however, there is still unrest in different parts of South Su-
dan. This is particularly the case in Upper Nile, Unity and Jonglei states, due 
to White Army militias and SSDF23 groups that have not laid down arms or 
joined one of the two regular armies24. In the south, especially in western 
Equatoria, LRA has caused some unrest, but since the peace talks started, the 
security situation has improved. 
An additional source of insecurity is from the SPLA itself. In several 
cases, soldiers dissatisfied with (lack of) payment and general conditions 
have been the cause of fighting. The integration of former SSDF adversaries 
into the SPLA may involve additional risks for such flare-ups within the 
army itself. 
UNMIS is the main instrument for international engagement in the secu-
rity sector.’ The mandate of this UN peacekeeping mission relates to the 
monitoring of the formation of the JIUs and the redeployment of forces, as 
well as to a more general monitoring of the implementation of the CPA. 
UNMIS has its mandate from the UN Security Council, and can deploy up to 
10,000 military troops and civilian personnel such as police.  
It is reported that the formation of JIUs are slow, and likewise that the re-
deployment of forces is slow. Even if UNMIS is reporting on the activities, 
there is little they can do to influence action directly. 
The US is working with the SPLA, supporting its transformation into a 
professional army. This work aims at creating improved structures for the 
troop that could be important for stemming the kind of dissatisfactions that 
have erupted into violence. 
GoSS is moderating and hosting the peace negotiations between LRA and 
the Government of Uganda, because a solution to this conflict is also impera-
tive to a sustainable peace in South Sudan. With regards to these negotia-
tions, many donors have pooled funds through OCHA in order to provide 
technical support to the negotiations. 
Implementation of the CPA  
Implementing the CPA and building peace in Sudan is an immense task. 
Although many issues are still pending, and the implementation goes slower 
than expected, the CPA is not abandoned. Main issues in the CPA are real-
ized: the establishment of GoNU and GoSS, transfer of oil revenues to GoSS 
and oil producing states, a new constitution is in place, several of the com-
                                                     
23  The South Sudan Defense Force consists of Southern militias that united in the fight 
against the SPLA during the war. The White Army militias are locally based militias, with 
less clear affiliations. 
24  The first major violation of the ceasefire occurred in Malakal 28-29 November between 
SPLA and SAF forces. 150 people were reported killed. According to UNMIS, both par-
ties have since regretted the violation of the ceasefire, agreed on immediate ceasefire, 
withdrawal of forces and a joint investigation. 
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missions are established, and the ceasefire is still holding.25 Yet, there are 
many challenges to overcome to ensure a lasting peace in Sudan. 
The CPA was an agreement between two parties; the GoS (represented 
by the NCP) and the SPLM and these parties are responsible for implement-
ing the agreement. At the same time it is a challenge to make the agreement 
national, and to include different political actors to feel ownership to the 
agreement. For example in the South the Juba declaration provided for an 
agreement between the SPLA and the SSDF and for SSDF members to 
choose to integrate into either the SPLA or the SAF army. But still there are 
SSDF groups that feel bound neither by the Juba agreement nor the CPA, 
and instead refer to the Khartoum agreement the SSDF made with the Gov-
ernment of Sudan in 1997. To include different political groups into the 
process of implementing the CPA is important for its viability.  
One of the main messages in the CPA is that the parties are committed to 
‘make unity attractive’. This means that during the interim period, before the 
referendum on the secession of the south, both parties should employ a na-
tional framework to their peacebuilding efforts. 
The Assessment and Evaluation Commission (AEC) is an important for-
mal arena. Its role is to monitor and evaluate the implementation of the 
commitments of the peace agreement. However, it seems as though the par-
ties have not fully engaged in developing the AEC as a useful tool. The AEC 
was described as a ‘toothless bulldog’ by one GoSS representative, and this 
echoed sentiments described by several others, alleging that the AEC did not 
have any leverage or means of enforcing adherence to the CPA. One diplo-
mat suggested that AEC as a mechanism for peacebuilding has a potential, 
but to fulfil this potential there is a need for making AEC smaller and more 
closed in order for it to be a real space for negotiations between the parties. 
One of the most important remaining issues in the implementation of 
CPA is the Abyei border issue. The Abyei protocol in the CPA grants the 
right to the citizens in the oil-rich region to determine whether they will join 
the South or remain in the North through a referendum, which is to be held 
before the referendum in the South. The Abyei protocol also provides for an 
Abyei Border Commission to define and demarcate the area26. This Com-
mission consisted of both international, independent experts, and representa-
tives from both Sudanese governments, and presented its report in July 2005. 
However, the Abyei Border Commission report was rejected by the Presi-
dent. Moreover, in May 2006 a joint NCP-SPLM leadership council meeting 
also failed to agree on the adoption of the report. It seems that the case is still 
in a deadlock. One consequence of this is that the area lacks an administra-
tion, which again has serious impediments for instance for service delivery. 
The problems and complexities in the Abyei case illustrates that there are 
several levels of conflicts that need to be addressed in order to achieve sus-
tainable peacebuilding in Sudan. In addition, it illustrates that international 
actors can only play a limited role, and that in the end local actors are the 
ones responsible. It is important, though, that international engagement does 
                                                     
25  With the exception of the incident in Malakal in November 2006 (referred to in the previ-
ous footnote). 
26  The Abyei area is described as “the area of the nine Ngok Dinka Chiefdoms transferred to 
Kordofan in 1905”. (United Nations, CPA monitor) 
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not contribute to conflict. Most importantly, the lack of implementation of 
the Abyei Boundary Commission report may bring into question implemen-
tation of the CPA. 
Conclusions 
Within all of three topics discussed in this section on peacebuilding, the role 
of the international community seems weak. The people of South Sudan 
have so far seen very little of the hoped-for peace dividend. While a large 
peace-keeping mission has been undertaken, its mandate is limited and few 
other international actors are engaged in security issues. And in terms of 
CPA implementation, crucial elements of the agreement are left hanging 
with limited opportunities for the international community to contribute con-
structively.  
There are several reasons for this bleak conclusion. On the one hand, 
peacebuilding is difficult and presupposes willingness and commitment of 
the parties to the conflict, something that has not always been equally forth-
coming. Secondly, international engagement has increasingly – and for un-
derstandable reasons – focused on the Darfur conflict, which has weakened 
the moral and political support for the implementation of CPA. And finally, 
the international community has shown little capacity to react with the speed 
that the situation in Sudan requires. 

4. Conclusions from the Sudan Case 
The international engagement in Sudan and the CPA provides interesting 
lessons and renders visible difficult dilemmas. The Sudan case shows clearly 
that there may possibly be a dilemma between peacebuilding on the one 
hand and state-building on the other. In order to deliver peace dividend on 
the ground, international actors need to be able to act fast. In contrast, donor 
coordination and efforts to secure the formation of accountable, transparent 
and democratic state institutions demands time and meticulous procedures. 
In this sense there may be a conflict between the peacebuilding and state-
building objectives. In Sudan it seems that the international community has 
not been aware of the need for making a trade-off, and that the delivering of 
a peace dividend has been suffering from this. 
 The challenge of rapid impact is also related to the issue of donor coor-
dination. As noted, the efforts to coordinate international engagement have 
been strong and relatively successful in Sudan. However, there have also 
been negative impacts of this strong emphasis on coordination. In addition to 
the problems of quick impact, there are two other areas where this can be 
seen: On the one hand, an overview of international engagement in Southern 
Sudan shows coordinated focus on building the capacities of the new state 
institutions in Juba. That this is given high priority is not surprising given the 
very real needs. Still, it means that there is less attention to building the state 
throughout South Sudan27, and importantly, to building the relationship be-
tween state and society (as highlighted in Principle three on state building).  
The second point is closely related to the first, namely that there may be a 
danger that civil society is left out of the equation through the focus on joint 
funding mechanisms. There are serious questions as to whether the fledgling 
Sudanese civil society will be able to live up to the strict requirements for 
funding posed by the MDTF structure. Furthermore, when civil society is 
considered, there is a tendency to limit the attention to service-providing 
roles. However, as the Principles point out, there is also a need for a strong 
civil society to demand good governance. These observations – the need to 
build the South Sudanese state throughout its territory and pay attention to 
issues of legitimacy as well as capacity, and the need to include civil society 
in both watchdog and service-delivering roles – mean that a broader ap-
proach is required in the international engagement with Sudan. Having a 
variety of different funding mechanisms may therefore imply advantages. 
Further observations from Sudan also show that there is a challenge for 
the donors to include a national (whole of Sudan) approach in the implemen-
tation of their engagement in Sudan, and that in practice, a two-country ap-
proach tends to apply on the operational level. This has implications for 
peacebuilding in that it weakens the ‘making unity attractive’ idea of the 
CPA. At the same time, building a good relationship between the two gov-
ernments is important regardless of the outcome of the referendum of separa-
tion. One Sudan or two Sudans – in any case a good relationship between 
them will be important for peace and stability. 
                                                     
27  UNDP does have a program of support to the states, but at lower levels international 
engagement appears virtually absent. 

5. Relevance of the Principles 
The OECD/DAC Principles for good international engagement in fragile 
states and situations are very relevant to the situation in Sudan. Some of the 
positive outcomes of the international engagement in Sudan stems from a 
focus on coordination and alignment, which are also important in the Princi-
ples. Thus, the high concern for coordination and harmonization has brought 
benefits in terms of reducing transaction costs for the recipient, avoiding the 
duplication of efforts, and strengthening local ownership. Several of the 
weaknesses of the international engagement in Sudan could have been 
avoided if the Principles had been followed more closely. For instance, with 
reference to state-building, the Principles emphasize the need to pay atten-
tion to the issue of legitimacy as well as of capacity. One weakness of the 
international engagement with Sudan has been the tendency to focus exclu-
sively on the latter issue.  
However, the lessons from Sudan also indicate that there are certain is-
sues that could be reflected more clearly in the Principles. In Sudan civil 
society has been left out of many processes, and when included, this has 
been in the role as providers of service delivery. In the Principles civil soci-
ety is mentioned under principle number three, focus on state-building, 
which states that civil society play an important role in developing the rela-
tionship between state and society, both in relation to service delivery and in 
relation to human rights, rule of law and democracy. It is therefore important 
that international engagement in Sudan involves civil society both as deliv-
erers of basic services and as political actors. This point could be empha-
sized even more explicitly in the Principles  
A second important lesson from Sudan that could play into the revision of 
the Principles, relates to the possible dilemmas between delivering a peace 
dividend fast and contributing to state-building, or between the objectives of 
coordination and acting fast, could have been made clearer. The Principles 
could perhaps state explicitly that there may sometimes have to be made 
trade-offs between these concerns, and that these choices should be made on 
the basis of an explicit recognition of the dilemmas involved. 
Finally, an issue that appears to be missing in the Principles relates to the 
role of the regional context, and a fragile states’ relationship with its 
neighbours. In many areas of the world – particularly where states are fragile 
– conflicts in one country tend to spill over into its neighbours. In Sudan’s 
case, such processes can be seen across its borders with a number of the 
neighbouring countries, for instance with respect to the LRA of Uganda. Yet 
the normal approach of the international community is to deal with these 
issues on a country-by-country basis. The Principles could perhaps also 
make reference to the importance of the regional context – for instance in 
connection with the need to take context as the starting point. 

Appendix 
Meeting Schedule in Sudan 22-30 November 2006 
 
Juba 
Name(s) Organisation 
Mr. Shyam K Bhurtel,  
Ms. Suela Krifsa and 
Mr. Anselme Sadiki 
Senior Governance Advisor (Team leader), pro-
gramme specialists 
UNDP 
Mr. Moses Mabior Director Aid Coordination, MoFEP 
Mr. Ronald P. Isaacson Senior Operations Officer, World Bank 
Ms. Emily Oldmeadow South Sudan Programme Manager EC 
Mr. David Gressly UN Deputy Resident and Humanitarian Coordi-
nator, Southern Sudan 
Mr. Richard Taylor 
Ms. Nynke Weinreich 
Ms. Marisia  Pechaczek 
Programme specialist, 
Policy Officer,  
Adviser Governance, 
Joint Donor Office 
Mr. Marv Koop Country Director, Pact Sudan 
Ms. Pauline Riak Chairperson, Anti-Corruption Commission 
Mr. Allan Reed Country Director, USAID 
Ms. Makila James Consul General of the United States 
HE Dr. Riek Machar Vice president GoSS, Minister Housing, Land 
and Public Utilities 
Mr. Caesar Arkangelo Suliman 
 
Chairman, Local Government Board, Office of 
the President 
 
Khartoum 
Name(s) Organisation 
Ms. Sumia El Sayed Secretary General, Sudanese Environment and 
Conservation Society 
Mr. Haj Hamad President, Social and Human Development Con-
sultative Group 
Ms. Suzan El Sadiq Executive Director, Noun Center for Women 
and Gender Rights 
Mr. Omar Muhamed Abdel Salam Director General of International Financial Co-
operation, Ministry of Finance, GoNU 
Mr. Hassan Salim ElHassan Arab League, Arab Organization for Agricul-
tural Development 
Mr. Asif Faiz Country manager, Sudan Country Office, World 
Bank 
Ms. Karin Wermester Programme Officer, Deputy Special Represen-
tatvie of the Secretary, UNMIS 
Mr. Mike McDonagh Senior Humanitarian Affairs Officer, OCHA 
HE Mr. Fridtjov Thorkildsen Ambassador, Norwegian Embassy in Khartoum 
International Engagement in Sudan after the CPA 40 
Mr. Endre Stiansen Norwegian Embassy in Khartoum 
Mr. Philippe Chichereau Advisor UNDP 
Mr. Elfatih Siddiq 
Mr. Mohamed Hilali 
Under-secretary, MIC (GoNU) 
Aid Management and Coordination Unit, MIC  
Ms. Sarah Offermans First Secretary, Dutch Embassy 
Ms. Kate Almquist 
Mr. Mark Meassick 
Mission Director, 
Deputy Office Director USAID 
Ms. Catherine Masterson DfID 
Ms. Gosia Lachut 
Mr. Luca Pierantoni 
Head of political section, European Commission 
Mr. Einar Risa Expert, Oil for Development, NORAD 
 
Oslo 
Name(s) Organisation 
Ms. Tove Westberg Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NMfA) 
Mr. Stein Erik Horjen NORAD 
Mr. Ivar Aarseth NORAD 
Ms. Anne Strand NMfA 
Ms. Kari Øyen Norwegian Church Aid 
Meeting Schedule in Sudan 4-12 June 2006  
 
Khartoum 
Mr. El Fatih el Siddig 
 
Under-secretary, Ministry of International Coop-
eration (MIC), GoNU 
Mr. Mohamed Hilali Aid Management and Coordination Unit , MIC 
Mr. Yahia H. Babiker 
Mr. Taj el Sir Mahgoub 
Chair, Joint National Transition Team (JNTT) 
Mr. Philippe Chichereau Senior Advisor, UNDP 
Ms. Ulrika Josefsson First Secretary, Swedish Embassy 
Mr. Jonathan Lingham Head of Office, DfID 
Ms. Corina van der Laan Deputy Head of Mission, Dutch Embassy  
Mr. Jaques Prade First Counsellor, European Union 
Ms. Nada Amin Information Officer, World Bank  
Mr. Jerzy Skuratowicz 
Mr. Dirk Hansohm 
Country Director, UNDP   
Senior Economic Advisor, UNDP 
Mr. Tom Vraalsen Chair, Assessment and Evaluation Commision 
Mr. Ramesh Rajasingham Chief, OCHA 
HE Mr. Fridtjov Thorkildsen Ambassador, Norwegian Embassy in Sudan 
 
Juba 
Ms. Liz Gaere  
Mr. Richard Taylor  
Ms. Marisia Pechaczek 
Ms Målfrid Ånestad 
Mr. Tron Ljødal 
Joint Donor Team 
Mr. H.N. Nayer Technical Advisor, World Bank, Juba 
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Mr. Luka Biong Deng Snr Economist/ Operations Adv. MDTF-SS, WB 
Mr. Francis Latio Michael, 
 
Undersecretary, Ministry of Finance and Eco-
nomic Planning (MoFEP)  
Mr. Moses Mabior Director Aid Coordination (MoFEP) 
Ms. Fiona Davies Aid Management Advisor (to MoFEP), UNDP 
Mr. Sanjeev S. Ahluwalia Senior Advisor, World Bank LICUS 
Ms. Chris Johnsen Country Director, UNDP Southern Sudan 
Mr. Michael Makuei Lueth Minister, Ministry of Legal Affairs and Constitu-
tional Development (GoSS) 
Mr. Rudi Mueller Chief, OCHA Southern Sudan 
Ms. Joy Kwaje Member of S. Sudan Legislative Assembly  
Mr. Peter Wal Director General, Ministry of Internal Affairs 
(GoSS) 
 
 
